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Abstract
The paper seeks to compare and contrast how different EEA (European Economic Area)
member states have adopted and made use of the public service obligation (PSO)
mechanism in air transport. Analysis shows that there is considerable variation in the
extent and way in which various countries have adopted the PSO mechanism. Some
countries, such as France, the Irish Republic and Norway, have made extensive use of
PSOs on their domestic scheduled air services networks. This is in contrast to the
approach adopted in the United Kingdom, where a number of lifeline air services are
vulnerable to potentially adverse airline pricing and output decisions. This suggests that
there are major inconsistencies in the approach and commitment to social air services
provision across the European Union which may undermine broader policy initiatives
designed to enhance mobility and accessibility.
1. Introduction
Subsidies awarded by regional and national governments to air carriers within the
European Union are allowed within the framework of Article 4 of Council Regulation
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22408/92 (CEC 1992), which came into effect on January 1st 1993. Under the
aforementioned regulation, EU member states and two EFTA1 countries (Iceland,
Norway) have the legal authority to impose a public service obligation (PSO) and award
financial compensation (subsidy) to an air carrier operating scheduled services. PSOs
can be imposed by member states on a route between two airports within their territorial
jurisdiction or an airport within their jurisdiction and an airport in another member state.
Public service obligations are imposed where adequate provision of air services in terms
of regularity of service, capacity and pricing is not possible if carriers are solely taking
their own commercial considerations into account. The rationale for imposing a PSO is
to sustain air services to remote regions for economic development purposes.
Eight EU member states (France, Germany, Irish Republic, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, UK) and Iceland and Norway currently impose public service obligations, the
vast majority of which are on domestic routes. Cross-border PSOs are imposed in
relation to several routes from Strasbourg, services between Erfurt in Germany and
Brussels, and between Derry in Northern Ireland (UK) and Dublin in the Irish Republic.
To date, there has been comparatively little research published on the subject of the PSO
system or on broader social air services subsidy policy issues. Some countries such as
France, the Irish Republic and Norway have had several years experience administering
PSOs. There is considerable scope therefore to investigate whether the system has
worked favourably and to identify the extent to which administrative authorities, small
community stakeholders and air carriers have experienced difficulties in coping with the
legislative parameters set by the PSO system. The number of PSOs in operation has
expanded considerably since the very first tenders were issued in the Irish Republic. By
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3the end of 1997 there were 64 PSO routes in operation, 42 of them in France. By
September 2001, the total number of PSOs had expanded to 164.
It is clear that the PSO mechanism has become increasingly used. It is therefore timely to
compare and contrast the way PSOs have been adopted by different countries. The
following section provides a brief introduction to the issue with references to past
literature on the subject. Section 3 contrasts the extent to which different countries have
adopted the PSO system. A discussion of the different ways in which PSOs have been
adopted in terms of minimum service level specifications and issues relating to the setting
of maximum air fares and subsidy levels are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6
assesses the different attitudes towards PSOs prevailing in different countries and where
and how the line is drawn between a PSO route and a non-PSO route. The paper
concludes with some recommendations as to how the PSO mechanism could be improved
upon and includes a brief outline of further research possibilities. A map showing the
precise locations of airports and communities cited in this paper is contained in Appendix
A.
Information on specific requirements (capacity, fares, frequency, aircraft size, etc) for
PSO tenders are published in editions of the Official Journal of the European
Communities. For the purposes of this paper these editions were gathered electronically
from the Eurolaw website 2.
2. Background
2 www.ili.co.uk
4Individual member states, through the relevant central government department have the
legal authority to impose PSOs. PSOs can be awarded, administered and subsidised by
either regional or national governments, either directly or through associated agencies.
The process involves initially issuing an invitation to tender which must be published in
the Official Journal of the European Communities. Once awarded, a carrier is granted a
monopoly on the route for a period not exceeding three years. The tender usually
stipulates minimum service levels and maximum fares that contracted air carriers need to
satisfy for the duration of the contract. There are two tender rounds. The initial tender
asks for submissions from air carriers who are able to operate services and meet the
tender specifications without subsidy. If no carrier is willing to offer a subsidy-free
operation, a second tender is issued which invites carriers to bid on the basis of receiving
a subsidy. The awarding authority then makes a decision taking into account the level of
subvention demanded, levels of service offered and any other relevant considerations. In
Iceland, the Irish Republic, Portugal, Norway and Sweden (through the National Public
Transport Agency) national governments are responsible for administering PSOs. In
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, regional authorities administer PSOs. In the UK,
where PSOs are only operated in Scotland, the Scottish Executive is responsible for
administering the Glasgow PSOs while regional authorities (Orkney, Shetland, Western
Isles) administer the others.
Outside of the EEA, the United States since 1978 has operated a system of subsidising air
services to small communities administered centrally by the Department of
Transportation (DoT) called the Essential Air Services Programme (EAS). The EAS
system currently serves 114 communities with an annual budget of around US$113
million. In contrast to the EU approach, which allows for regional (member state)
subsidiarity in deciding on which routes should be subsidised, the EAS programme sets
5out those communities that are eligible to have subsidised air services on the basis of
distance from the nearest large, medium, small and non-hub commercial airport
(Reynolds-Feighan, 1999). The Secretary of Transportation determines the level of
service for each remote community. If a service is not being provided on a commercial
basis, the DoT invites carriers to tender and specify the level of subsidy required. In
contrast to the PSO scheme, a second carrier that is able to offer subsidy-free services can
enter the market. In these circumstances, the DoT gives notice to the incumbent that the
subsidy is to be withdrawn and the incumbent then has the choice of operating services
without subsidy or discontinuing services. According to Reynolds-Feighan (1996), this
provision for market entry provides incentives for minimising subsidy levels. The EAS
limits the level of subsidy to US$200 per passenger.
The robustness of the EAS system has been strongly tested since the events of September
11, 2001 as air carriers in the United States have been reducing service levels particularly
to small communities. This trend has been exacerbated by low cost carriers which have
increased their services at medium and large-size hub airports, thereby adversely
affecting traffic levels at small airports within the same catchment area (ATI, 2003).
According to ATI (2003), critics argue that the EAS eligibility criteria remains too
restrictive and is subject to differing interpretation. For example, the DoT rejected the
community of Lancaster’s application for EAS subsidy because it was deemed to be 65.3
miles from Pennsylvania calculated on the basis of the shortest distance using small roads
rather than the most commonly used road 3.
In the first published critique of Article 4 of Regulation 2408/92, Reynolds-Feighan
(1995) argued that the European Commission (EC) should consider adopting some of the
3 EAS eligibility criteria currently prohibits the DoT from subsidising air services to airports that are
located within 70 miles of the nearest medium or large sized hub airport.
6features of the EAS system. The author identified two key deficiencies in the PSO
system, one relating to member state-level administration of PSOs and the other the
existence of barriers to entry. Administration of PSOs by individual member states is
criticised on the basis that there has been an inconsistent application of the PSO
instrument across the EU leading to imbalances in the level and provision of air services
to small communities. Reynolds-Feighan (1995) argued that a centralised EU-level
programme would lead to a more transparent process and greater efficiency in the
matching of funds to regional needs.
It was also noted that the regulation does not deal with the payment of subsidies for
proposed service levels that are an improvement on or are in addition to the minimum
levels stipulated in the tender. Member-state level administration of PSOs, which to
some extent can be justified on the grounds of the widely differing geographical, social
and economic conditions prevailing between countries, is often subject to strong local
political pressures, which can result in highly-subjective, politically-motivated decision-
making. The result can be the imposition of an excessive number of PSOs that bear little
relation to issues of peripherality, economic development and the availability of
alternative transportation services. Sletten (2001) claimed that there were examples of
strong political pressures being exerted by regional lobby groups in the development of
Norway’s PSOs during the 1990s.
Barriers to entry are evident within the PSO system. One particular challenge faced by
PSO administering authorities is in ensuring that bidding processes are sufficiently
competitive. The problem for many potential new entrants is that there can be significant
sunk costs associated with operating PSO services particularly given that the contracted
air carrier is awarded a monopoly on a route for only three years. This may partly
explain why in some of the more remote low traffic-density PSO markets, long-
7established local air carriers such as Widerøe Flyvesselskap in Norway and Loganair in
Scotland continue to dominate their national PSO markets. Interestingly, the Norwegian
government, which issued new tenders in 2002 for its PSO routes, received special
dispensation from the European Commission (through the EFTA Surveillance Authority
4) to offer tenders in the form of packages rather than on an individual basis. This was
done to allow air carriers to achieve economies of scale in the operation of the subsidised
air services. The Norwegian government reportedly received bids from seven carriers,
but it was not specified how many bids were received for each PSO package (ATI 2002a).
The recently released Irish government PSO tenders for services from Dublin to Donegal,
Galway, Kerry, Knock and Sligo reportedly received bids from three airlines, two Irish-
registered (Aer Arann and Euroceltic) and one Danish (Newair) (ATI 2002b). Aer Arran,
which held the previous tender for all the routes, lost two of them (Donegal, Sligo) to
Euroceltic. This would tend to suggest that it is possible for PSO tenders to be
competitive. However, Euroceltic was declared bankrupt at the beginning of 2003 and
Aer Arann is once again operating the two routes.
Another potential entry barrier arises as a result of there being only one month allowed to
lapse between notification of the tender and the submission of bids. Within this time
frame, air carriers face the challenge, in addition to preparing proposals, of securing
suitable aircraft to operate on the route. According to Sletten (2001), this can be
particularly difficult in the STOL market. For example, in the year 2000 Norwegian PSO
tender, one carrier stated that it could identify only eight DHC-8 aircraft that were
available. Furthermore, all of them needed expensive engine conversions and only two
could be guaranteed for delivery at the start of the PSO contract (April 2000).
4 Body set up to monitor implementation of obligations by EFTA countries which are signatories to the
Agreement on the European Economic Area. Norway and Iceland have both signed up to and adopted
Council Regulation 2408/92.
8While there appears to exist considerable scope for reform, it is beyond the aims of this
paper to consider these issues in greater depth. The focus here is to contrast the ways in
which countries have made use of the PSO mechanism.
3. Extent of PSO coverage
As far as assessing the extent to which countries have made use of the PSO mechanism is
concerned, Table 1 lists the number of PSO routes operational in September 2001 in the
domestic scheduled markets of each EU member and EEA signatory state.
Norway has the largest number of PSO routes followed by France. In the former case,
the majority of routes are located in the North of the country on services linking remote
communities. In France, most of the PSOs are imposed on routes between a number of
small regional airports (e.g. Brest, Roanne, Rodez) and Paris, and between major cities on
the French mainland (Marseille, Nice, Paris) and airports on the Island of Corsica
(Ajaccio, Bastia, Calvi and Figari). Skreikes (2003) explains that the reason why France
has imposed a large number of PSOs is mainly due to a strong commitment within France
both at national and regional level to connect the regions to Paris for economic
development purposes.
In Spain the thirteen PSOs are all currently imposed on inter-Canary Island services,
while the ten PSO routes in Portugal have been imposed on services linking the mainland
with the Azores and Madeira, and on one mainland service (Lisbon-Villa Real-
Bragança). In the UK, all twelve PSOs are imposed on internal Scottish routes covering
services within the Shetland Islands, Orkney Islands and Western Isles, and on services
from Glasgow to Barra, Campbeltown and Tiree. In September 2001, Sweden had one
PSO route (Umea-Ostersund), but a further ten new tenders were issued in 2002, most of
them on routes linking various regional airports (Gallivare, Torsby etc) with Stockholm.
9In the Irish Republic, all domestic scheduled routes, with the exceptions of Dublin-
Shannon and Dublin-Cork, have PSOs imposed on them. As for Germany, in September
2001, there were five PSO routes, all of them linking airports in the East (Erfurt, Hof,
Bayreuth) with Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg and Cologne/Bonn.
Figure 1 provides a measure of the scope of PSO coverage in each country by showing
the proportion of total domestic scheduled seating capacity in September 2001 accounted
for by PSO routes.
In Portugal, PSO routes account for 40% of total domestic seating capacity. This is
explained by the deployment of large capacity aircraft on routes linking the mainland and
the Azores and Madeira. France, Norway and Scotland have very similar levels
(approximately 10%), while the proportion of domestic seats accounted for by PSOs in
Germany, Iceland and Sweden is relatively insignificant. It should be noted, however,
that there has been a very recent expansion in the number of German PSO routes (e.g.
Rostock to Frankfurt and Munich) and the imposition of ten new PSOs in Sweden.
Figure 2 contrasts average sector distance on PSO routes. The effect of the relatively
long-haul mainland-island PSOs on the Portuguese average is apparent. In France, PSO
routes are generally associated with relatively long sector-distances, particularly on
routes between Paris and Corsica. By contrast, in the majority of cases, in Norway,
Scotland and Spain (Canary Islands), PSOs have been imposed on very short-sector
distance routes. This is particularly apparent on several of the Scottish intra-island routes
where flying times are of the order of ten to fifteen minutes.
Figure 3 contrasts the average seating capacity per flight between countries. These
results are to a large extent a function of both sector distance and traffic density. Aircraft
with relatively high seating capacities operate the majority of French, Italian and
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Portuguese PSOs. On the Italian PSOs for example, which link Rome and Milan to
airports in Sardinia, the tenders stipulate a requirement that the contracted air carrier
operate jet aircraft. Scottish PSO flights have an average seating capacity of only twelve
as they are imposed mainly on routes associated with very short sector distances and low
traffic volumes. On Irish and Norwegian PSOs, turboprop aircraft with seating capacities
in the region of thirty to fifty seats (Dash 8-100, ATR-42) are deployed.
4. Minimum service levels
All PSOs in operation in September 2001 required the operator to satisfy fixed levels of
service for the duration of the contract. In the majority of tenders, the air carrier is
required to meet a minimum level of service frequency and / or a minimum level of
seating capacity to be supplied over a specific period of time (day, week, month). Levels
of service are established on the basis of what the administering authority considers to be
appropriate service standards on each route given the volume of traffic and sector
distance. For example, some routes in Scotland, such as Glasgow-Campbeltown, have a
minimum requirement for two weekday round trips, while on Lerwick-Papa Stour
(Shetland Islands), a route with much lower traffic, the minimum requirement is for two
return trips on a Thursday. There may also be requirements related to the minimum size
of aircraft and to the timetabling of services. Table 2 lists the various service level
requirements contained in each country’s PSOs.
All Scottish PSOs stipulate a minimum level of service frequency, with only the Glasgow
routes containing specific minimum capacity requirements. The only exceptions to the
minimum frequency requirement is to be found in the Canary Islands, where most routes
contain minimum levels of seating capacity rather than service frequency. Here and in
other regions where there are significant seasonal fluctuations in traffic (e.g. French
11
mainland - Corsica, Italian Mainland - Sardinia) there are separate capacity requirements
for both winter and summer seasons.
Carriers are often required to deploy aircraft with a minimum seating capacity, while in
some countries only pressurised equipment must be used (e.g. Norway). Aircraft size
requirements are to a significant extent driven by airfield operational limits, which
restrict both the size and type of aircraft. For example, for services within the Orkney
and Shetland islands in Scotland, the nine-seat BN Islander aircraft is the only
commercial aircraft that can operate from the very short airstrips. In Norway, the
requirement that carriers operate pressurised aircraft was to a large extent driven by
political pressure from regional lobby groups.
Timetabling requirements feature in many PSO tenders. This is because the
administering authority is seeking to ensure that schedules offered are as convenient as
possible to the general public. For example, allowing passengers to complete a day trip
to and from their destination and the ability to make convenient onward connections.
The requirement can be fairly detailed as in the case of German PSOs where services
from Erfurt to both Munich and Berlin are required to arrive and depart within specific
time-intervals. In France, it is fairly common for PSO tenders to stipulate that passengers
should be able to spend at least seven, eight or nine hours at their destination before being
able to return home. In the Irish Republic, the PSOs demand that there should be an early
morning departure from the regional airport (Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Knock, Sligo) to
Dublin and a return flight from Dublin at the end of the day. At slot-constrained airports
in France, Germany and Italy, member state governments have exercised their right to
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reserve take-off and landing slots for PSO services under provisions contained in EC slot
regulation 95/93 (CEC, 1993) 5.
The specification of timetabling requirements has implications regarding both the
positioning and utilisation of aircraft and therefore the overall costs of the operation and
level of subsidy. Allowing air carriers the freedom to set their own timetables and adjust
them on the basis of market conditions will have cost advantages. However, the
difficulty with allowing carriers freedom in this regard is that while service frequency
may be adequate, timings of services may be unsuitable, with passengers often being
forced to spend an overnight stay at their destination or being unable to connect with
onward flights from the main hub airport. Table 3 contrasts minimum service levels on a
selection of PSO routes.
Differences highlighted in this sample of routes serve to illustrate disparities in the way
PSOs are used by countries, reflecting different priorities and broader differences in the
extent to which governments are prepared to intervene in the market to secure regional,
economic and social policy goals. For example, on the Glasgow-Barra PSO a minimum
level of service frequency and daily capacity is stipulated, but there is no timetabling
requirement. By contrast, the Irish government specifies a level of frequency, capacity
and aircraft type on the Dublin-Donegal PSO. Timetabling requirements are stipulated in
the PSOs for Epinal-Paris Orly and Cologne/Bonn-Erfurt. Although in the former case,
no specific times or time intervals are set, the PSO tender requires that schedules are
established which guarantee at least eight hours at the destination.
The requirements set by PSO administering authorities are to a large extent driven by
how far policy-makers are prepared to intervene through subsidies in the market to secure
a specific level of service and fare. For example, Scottish PSO minimum service levels
5 Article 9
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appear to be relatively more relaxed than in some other countries. This may be a
reflection of an instinctively less interventionist approach by both the Scottish Executive
and UK government. A more restrictive scheduling requirement may inflate the level of
subsidy required and be an additional barrier to entry thereby reducing the
competitiveness of the PSO tendering process. In some other countries, the levels of
complexity contained in PSO minimum service requirements are greater, in particular, on
French Mainland-Corsica PSOs and to a slightly lesser extent on those imposed in
Norway.
5. Regulating the cost of travel and level of subsidy
Most PSO tenders require operators to set air fares within a limit specified by the
administering authority. The only major exceptions are in France where most of the
mainland PSOs exclude any such requirement. Table 4 provides details on the approach
to regulating fares within PSO contracts in different countries.
In Scotland, all PSOs stipulate a maximum one-way unrestricted economy fare. These
range from €156 on Glasgow-Barra to €24 on Kirkwall to North Ronaldsay and Papa
Westray services. The Shetland Island PSOs have a fare limit of between €26 and €60.
There are no special fare discounts offered to categories of passengers on any of the
Scottish PSO routes.
Fare restrictions are also applied on all the Irish PSO routes. Each PSO has unrestricted
return fare limits of between €111 and €124. The operating carrier is required to make
available a proportion of seats at these air fares. For example, on Dublin-Kerry, out of
the minimum level of seats required throughout the day, sixty must be offered at €111,
sixty at €124 and the remaining thirty can be offered at a fare of the airline’s choosing.
However, there are currently no special discounts for specific categories of passenger.
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In Germany, air carriers which have been awarded PSOs on services from Erfurt cannot
exceed €82 + €0.25 per km for a single fare. On the Hof-Bayreuth-Frankfurt PSO, the air
carrier is not permitted to set a fare that exceeds the price of a single fare on Nuremberg-
Frankfurt by 5%.
The vast majority of PSOs operating in Italy, Portugal and Spain are on routes linking
mainland airports with island communities. On Italian and Portuguese PSOs and those
linking the French mainland and Corsica, carriers are required to offer special discounts
or low fares to island residents. For example, on services between the Portuguese
mainland and the Madeira airports (Funchal, Porto Santo), residents of the islands and
students studying on the mainland are eligible for a 40% discount. Other discounts are
also available on services between the mainland and the Azores. However, it should be
noted that air services are the only means of travel to and from the mainland as there are
no ferry services. In Italy, where there are a network of PSOs linking Sardinian airports
(Alghero, Cagliari, Olbia) with both Rome and Milan, there exists a maximum fare limit
applicable to all passengers. However, there are also special lower fares which are
offered to Sardinian residents, Sardinian immigrants living on the mainland, the disabled,
students and persons aged under 25 and over 70. A similar approach exists on the
French Mainland-Corsican routes where there is a maximum fare and a discounted lower
fare, which is offered to various categories of passenger.
The extent of regulatory complexity in the PSO tender and the scale and degree to which
fares are capped will determine the level of subsidy required to meet the contracted air
carrier’s operating deficit. Table 5 provides data on levels of subsidy awarded on PSO
contracts in different countries for the year 2000.
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Differences in the aggregate level of subsidy are to a large extent directly correlated to
the volume of passenger traffic and the number of PSO routes. Subsidy levels range from
€46 million awarded in Norway to just €0.6 million in Sweden. There are also marked
variations in the average level of subsidy per passenger. The average subsidy per
passenger on the Erfurt PSOs was €136 in 2000. Average per passenger subsidy levels
in Scotland, Norway and Sweden are broadly the same, while the lowest levels of subsidy
per passenger were on PSOs in France, the Irish Republic and Portugal where traffic
volumes are higher and unit operating costs lower.
Table 6 compares the average subsidy per passenger of selected PSOs by route, or group
of routes, in France, the Irish Republic, Norway and the UK. It is apparent that there are
not only significant differences between countries but also within countries in levels of
average subsidy per passenger. For example, PSO air service networks on the Scottish
Islands of Orkney and Shetland are very similar in terms of sector distance. However,
the average subsidy per passenger awarded in Shetland (€83) is over double that in
Orkney (€40). This difference may be due to the fact that traffic volumes on Shetland
inter-island services are two thirds that of Orkney, which would allow for better
utilisation of aircraft and economies of scale. The Vardø-Kirkenes PSO in Norway has
similarities with both Orkney and Shetland in terms of capacity offered and sector
distance. Yet the average subsidy in 2000 was €173 per passenger, which is double that
of Shetland. It is probable that part of the differences were accounted for by the
relatively high costs associated with operating the Dornier 228 on the Vardø-Kirkenes
PSO compared to the Britten-Norman Islander, which is used on the inter-island services
in Orkney and Shetland. However, differences in the maximum fares that can be charged
are highly significant. The maximum one-way fare, which can be levied on Vardø-
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Kirkenes, is €68 compared to €61 on the Shetland services, in spite of the fact that
operating costs appear to be much higher on the Norwegian route.
A comparison of the traffic volumes and maximum fare levels set on the busiest PSO
routes in France, the Irish Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Scotland
and Sweden in 2001 is given in Tables 7 and 8. It is apparent that the PSOs linking
France, Italy and Portugal with their respective island communities have high volumes of
traffic. For example, the average number of passengers on the four routes from Paris to
Corsica is approximately 200,000, a level that would imply commercial viability under
most operating conditions.
While the range of minimum service requirements and limits on fare are key influencing
factors, the level of subsidy on a PSO will also be influenced by how competitive the
PSO tendering process is. The total level of subsidy in Norway for the tenders issued in
2000 was 15% higher than in 1997, mainly due to the lack of competing tender proposals
being submitted (Sletten, 2001). This may be due to the existence of entry barriers, in
particular, the risk of incurring high sunk costs as a result of operating groups of routes in
Norway. It is also significant that so few examples exist of carriers from other countries
operating such services. The only example of a PSO route from these three countries that
is not operated by a local carrier is Dublin-Derry, which is served by the Scottish airline
Loganair.
A number of factors influence the amount of subsidy that will be required to operate a
given PSO service. The costs of operating a route will be strongly affected by the size
and type of aircraft to be used. An older, unpressurised aircraft, such as a Shorts 360,
will invariably be less expensive to run than a regional jet, for example. The route length,
available airport infrastructure, the volume and seasonal nature of the traffic, and the type
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of route will determine the choice of aircraft to be employed. Operations to small islands
such as those in the west of Ireland are really only feasible with small aircraft seating
fewer than ten passengers. In other circumstances, a trade off will exist between service
frequency and aircraft size. On a given route, for example, using a 19 seat aircraft may
make it possible to offer three flights per day, whereas use of a more sophisticated 50
seater may restrict operations to once daily. The nature of the route will also affect the
schedule to be provided. It may be that a service links an outlying island with a regional
centre, in which case the traffic will be mostly point-to-point. In other instances, the
service will be providing feeder traffic to connect with other regional operations.
To demonstrate the strange mix that is apparent between EU countries, two PSO routes
are contrasted below. Information about the two operations is contained in Table 9. It is
interesting to note that it is the more heavily trafficked route between Dublin and
Donegal that has the higher subsidy. The Scottish route from Glasgow to the Hebridean
island of Tiree with around half the traffic of the Irish example requires 45% less subsidy.
Both routes have a service once a day during the week, with load factors in the low 40s.
The Donegal service was operated by Aer Arann until recently with a Shorts 360 aircraft,
equipped with 36 seats. This has subsequently been upgraded to a 50 seat ATR 42,
providing a more comfortable journey for passengers. A much smaller and less
sophisticated aircraft, the unpressurised De Havilland Twin Otter, equipped with 19 seats,
provides the service to Tiree. The use of this aircraft by Loganair is to a large extent
influenced by their PSO operation to the island of Barra. The airstrip at Barra is the
cockleshell beach at Castlebay, to which the Twin Otter is ideally suited. Attempts to use
a larger, heavier aircraft on this service have not proved successful. Hence, the Tiree
operation remains in the hands of the Twin Otter.
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Fare levels are of key significance in explaining the differing levels of subsidy. On the
Dublin-Donegal route, the maximum return fare was set at €108 whilst the equivalent
price for the Glasgow-Tiree service was close to double this level at €240. In terms of
subsidy per single passenger journey, the Tiree operation was a little more expensive.
Without the higher fare however, the level of subsidy would have been much greater. It is
clear that the Irish Government is more generous in providing subsidies for essential air
services than is the Scottish Executive.
6. PSO vs non-PSO: where do national governments draw the line?
One very important point to be made regarding the application of PSOs in the European
Union is that national governments appear to have very different notions of which routes
deserve to have PSO regulatory protection and associated subsidy and those that do not.
Norway is similar to the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in terms of topography and to
some extent population size and density. While the Norwegian government has made
extensive use of PSOs not only in the remoter regions of the country, in Scotland, most of
the PSOs have been imposed on very low volume, short sector distance routes located in
peripheral regions. The only routes involving the mainland are those from Glasgow to
Barra, Campbeltown and Tiree. Other lifeline links that are equally vital strategically and
economically, such as Orkney-Aberdeen and Shetland-Aberdeen, are however excluded
from the PSO regime. These apparent inconsistencies in government policy can be
illustrated by contrasting services between Aberdeen and Sumburgh (Shetland) with
comparable PSO routes in other countries.
Aberdeen-Sumburgh is served three times daily with a 64-seat ATP aircraft operated by
British Airways Citiexpress, while Oslo-Førde is served five times daily with a 37-seat
Dash 8-100 operated by Widerøe Flyvesselskap. The overall level of weekly capacity
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between the two routes is therefore broadly similar. If one measures peripherality in
terms of provision of surface transport services, then in both cases, travellers would face
the alternative of considerably more lengthy journeys using alternative transport modes.
In the Norwegian case, the only alternative to the Førde-Oslo PSO air service is a once a
day thirteen-hour journey by coach. The alternative to travelling by air between
Aberdeen and the Shetland Islands is a daily fourteen-hour voyage by sea, a trip often
subject to delay as a result of adverse weather conditions especially during the winter
months. However, in spite of the fact that air transport offers much more convenient
access between Aberdeen and Sumburgh, the Scottish Executive and UK Government
has chosen not to impose a PSO. In Norway the government has chosen to do otherwise
on a similar route. As a consequence, pricing and output (capacity, frequency, aircraft
size) decisions on Aberdeen-Shetland are subject to the commercial imperatives of the
operator, while minimum service levels and maximum fares between Oslo and Førde are
determined by the Norwegian government. In the North of Scotland, there is a campaign
currently being waged by local stakeholders to extend the scope of PSOs in the face of a
very strong perception amongst the general public that fares on non-PSO air services
between peripheral regions and the mainland are very high. There is also an opinion
widely expressed amongst stakeholders that lower fares will encourage greater mobility,
thereby reversing recent declines in traffic levels on a number of routes (Press & Journal,
2002).
In many cases the line between PSO and non-PSO designation is arbitrary and often the
product of how successful regional lobby groups have been at influencing national
policy. Such decisions rest strongly on whether a government’s aviation policy is
inherently interventionist or market-orientated. Differences in approach are very
apparent when the attitudes to PSOs of decision-makers in both Scotland and the UK as a
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whole are compared with those prevailing in France. The route linking Nice and Figari
(Corsica), for example, can be compared with Aberdeen-Sumburgh in terms of distance,
frequency, aircraft size and overall capacity. Both services link airports on the respective
mainland with island communities. The French air service however is subsidised while
the comparable Scottish route is not. At the behest of the Corsican regional authorities
France has imposed a PSO on the Nice-Figari route, with minimum levels of service
requirements and maximum fares stipulated. Several other routes linking Corsica with
mainland cities also have PSO status. It is apparent the French authorities have made
extensive use of PSOs, even where traffic volumes on some of the routes would appear to
be at a level that would normally imply commercial viability. For example, Paris-Ajaccio
handled 382,654 passengers in 2000. The impetus for imposing PSOs has come mainly
from regional authorities and local chambers of commerce who are of the view that
regular, convenient and affordable air service links to Paris are a social and economic
imperative.
The Dublin-Kerry PSO route in the Irish Republic is also very similar to Aberdeen-
Sumburgh, in terms of sector distance, traffic volume, capacity and frequency offered.
The key point however in this case is that Sumburgh in the Shetland Islands is more
peripheral relative to Aberdeen, than Kerry is to Dublin. Whilst it takes approximately
four hours to travel by train from Killarney (County Kerry) to Dublin, it takes some
fourteen hours to travel by sea from Aberdeen to Lerwick (Shetland Islands).
One problem highlighted by regional stakeholders in the Highlands and Islands of
Scotland is the fact that the motivations for expanding the scope of PSOs have more to do
with achieving affordable airfares and improved flight times, rather than simply
maintaining access. While some low-density peripheral routes are being provided
commercially they are subject to constraints imposed by aircraft scheduling, resulting in
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flight timings that make day-trips either impossible or very difficult to achieve. A PSO
could address this problem by stipulating departure and arrival times, as well as service
frequency. The affordability of air travel has become a key policy issue in the Highlands
and Islands of Scotland where there is growing anecdotal evidence of comparatively high
fares (Press & Journal, 2002). If demand were sufficiently price elastic, subsidy levels
need not be high.
Clearly, the result of member-state level designation of PSOs is that significant
imbalances exist in the provision of air services to small communities between different
regions across the EU (Reynolds-Feighan, 1995). As a consequence, EU-level
administration of PSOs has been suggested as an alternative to the existing regime,
whereby PSOs would be adopted on the basis of common and transparent criteria as
exists in the US Essential Air Services Programme. The current PSO system incorporates
an element of subsidiarity in decision-making. This is achieved through, on the one hand,
establishing a common EU-wide legal framework to administer PSOs, with, on the other
hand, issues such as which routes should be subsidised and how much subsidy should be
paid, being left to the discretion of member states who make decisions on the basis of
their own economic and regional policy goals. However, by granting member states this
discretion, imbalances in provision, affordability and access do occur and may run
counter to broader EC social, economic and regional policy objectives. For example, the
European Commission has made various long-term policy commitments to enhancing
economic and social cohesion across the Union. Central to achieving this aim must be to
have a sustainable transport strategy which is able to deliver enhanced mobility and
access between peripheral regions and major economic and political decision-making
centres. A fully transparent and non-discriminatory EU-level administered social air
services programme would to some extent assist in the attainment of these broader
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economic and social aspirations. Greater mobility and accessibility for communities
located in peripheral regions cannot be achieved universally by leaving key decisions to
individual member states, as these will be influenced significantly by the degree to which
regional interests are able to exert influence over national government policy.
7. Conclusions
This paper has highlighted differences in terms of the degree to which member states
have adopted the PSO mechanism in respect of air transport services. Countries such as
France and Norway have made extensive use of PSOs. In the case of Norway, this is
mainly due to the fact that there are many small communities located in remote regions
where air transport is the only viable means of public transport. By contrast, in France
some of the routes that have been given PSO status have convenient surface transport
alternatives and some have large traffic volumes. Germany is increasingly making use of
the PSO mechanism, with regional governments using PSOs as part of a broader
economic strategy to achieve a greater degree of integration between East and West
German economies. In all three of the above-mentioned countries, national government
policy-makers appear to be more receptive to regional political pressures than in the UK
where intensive lobbying by regional stakeholders in the Highlands and Islands has failed
to persuade both the national government and the Scottish Executive to expand the scope
of the PSO mechanism to other routes.
As a result of a less than enthusiastic view of the role of PSOs in air transport, the system
has not been adopted to the same extent in the UK as it has been in other countries (UK
DETR, 1999). This is in spite of the fact that many communities located in peripheral
regions have faced problems of maintaining conveniently timed and affordable air
services, which to some extent could have been ameliorated through the use of PSOs.
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Given, differences in member states’ attitudes and approaches toward PSOs, and the
consequent imbalances in the provision of air services, there are convincing arguments
for centralising the administration and funding of PSOs at EU-level. This, in theory at
least, could result in a more efficient and equitable distribution of subsidy, and a greater
degree of consistency with broader EU economic, social and regional development goals.
An investigation of the price elasticities of demand for air travel between various
peripheral communities and their corresponding economic centres would be required if
such an approach were to be adopted. How an EU-level system could be implemented is
beyond the scope of the paper, but would also form a useful topic for research.
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Appendix A: Map of airports cited in the paper
Table 1: Number of Domestic market PSOs by Country (September 2001)








































































10 more PSOs were introduced in 2002
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities
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France-Corsica All routes Most routes All routes Most routes
France-Mainland All routes Some routes All routes Most routes
Germany All routes Some routes Yes All routes
Iceland All routes None Yes All routes
Irish Republic All routes All routes Yes All routes
Italy All routes All routes All routes All routes
Norway All routes All routes Yes All routes
Portugal All routes Most routes Most routes Some routes
Scotland All routes Some routes Yes None
Spain Some routes All routes No Most routes
Sweden All routes All routes None None
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities
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Glasgow-Barra 1 per day 11-14 seats per day None None
Cologne/Bonn-Erfurt 2 per day None 18-seat Return flight (0600-1000) &
(1500-2200)
Donegal-Dublin 1 per day 30 seats per flight 30-seat
pressurised
None
Epinal-Paris Orly 2 per weekday None 18-seat Morning and evening
(minimum 8 hours in
destination)
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities
30








France-Corsica All routes None All routes All routes None
France-mainland Most routes None None None None
Germany All routes None None None None
Iceland All routes None None None None
Irish Republic All routes None None None None
Italy All routes All routes All routes All routes All routes
Norway All routes None None None None
Portugal Most routes All routes Some routes None None
Scotland All routes None None None None
Spain All routes None None None None
Sweden None None None None None
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities
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France 4 18.3 840,461 21.77
Germany 3 2.5 18,440 135.57
Irish Republic 2 4.4 187,744 23.43
Norway 5 46.2 765,880 60.32
Portugal 1 28.2 809,084 34.85
Sweden 0.6 11,000 54.54
UK 2.8 40,882 68.48
Sources: ATI (2002c), Irish Government Department of Public Enterprise, Norwegian Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications, Orkney Islands Council, Rikstraffiken (Sweden), Freistat Thuringen (Germany), Scottish Executive,
Shetland Islands Council, Western Isles Council
1 Subsidy and passenger traffic refer to1999
2 Dublin-Knock and Dublin-Londonderry not included
3 Only Erfurt PSOs included
4 Only Paris-Corsica PSOs included
5 No Subsidy or traffic data for route areas 5 and 6
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Table 6: Average subsidy (in €) per passenger versus annual passenger traffic: selected
PSOs 2000
Route/ Routes Country Traffic
Average subsidy per
passenger in €
Paris-Corsica France 840,461 21.77
Group 9 1 Norway 158,911 48.26
Group 1 2 Norway 115,438 118.81
Group 10 3 Norway 102,048 31.91
Group 8 4 Norway 101,515 46.44
Group 12 5 Norway 81,751 102.41
Dublin-Kerry Irish Republic 78,578 12.27
Dublin-Galway Irish Republic 72,315 19.01
Group 11 6 Norway 54,907 53.58
Group 3 7 Norway 47,352 34.78
Group 4 8 Norway 37,295 48.20
Group 7 9 Norway 32,974 25.54
Roros-Oslo Norway 24,597 20.95
Dublin-Sligo Irish Republic 24,434 36.10
Glasgow-West Scotland UK 17,278 93.35
Dublin-Donegal Irish Republic 12,417 82.06
Western Isles UK 12,218 37.31
Group 2 10 Norway 9,100 172.68
Orkney UK 6,863 39.95
Shetland UK 4,523 82.73
Sources: Irish Government Department of Public Enterprise, Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications,
Orkney Islands Council, Scottish Executive, Shetland Islands Council, Western Isles Council, ATI (2002c)
1
Mo i Rana-Bodø, Mo i Rana-Trondheim, Rørvik-Trondheim, Namsos-Trondheim, Mosjøen-Trondheim, Mosjøen-Bodø
2
Hasvik-Hammerfest, Hasvik-Tromsø, Vadsø-Båtsfjord-Berlevåg-Mehamn-Honningsvåg-Hammerfest and between these


















Table 7: Passenger traffic levels on the busiest PSO routes by country in September 2001
Country / Region Busiest route Passenger traffic (2000) Frequency weekly
(one-way) June
2000
France Paris-Ajaccio 382,654 33
Iceland Reykjavik-Gjogur 350 2
Irish Republic Dublin-Kerry 79,000 25
Italy Rome-Cagliari 509,466 84
Norway Svolvær-Bodø 69,285 1 31
Portugal Lisbon-Funchal 660,306 2 95
Scotland Stornoway-Benbecula 9,611 10
Sweden Umea-Ostersund 11,000 11
Sources: DGAC France, Icelandic Ministry of Communications, Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd, Zuccarini-Gagnoni
(2002), Brown (2003), Official Journal of the European Communities, Rikstrafiken (Sweden), Norwegian Ministry of
Transport & Communications
1




Table 8: Maximum fare levels set on tenders for the busiest PSO routes by country
(September 2001)







per Km in €
France Paris-Ajaccio 906 144 0.16
Iceland Reykjavik-Gjogur 352 61 0.17
Irish Republic Dublin-Kerry 259 62 0.24
Italy Rome-Cagliari 393 66 0.17
Norway Svolvær-Bodø 109 91 0.83
Portugal Lisbon-Funchal 964 70 1 0.07
Scotland Stornoway-Benbecula 104 92 0.88
Sweden Umea-Ostersund 293 no limit n/a
Sources: DGAC France, Icelandic Ministry of Communications, Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd, Zuccarini-Gagnoni
(2002), Brown (2003), Official Journal of the European Communities, Rikstrafiken (Sweden), Norwegian Ministry of
Transport & Communications
1
Applicable to residents of the island of Madeira only
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Table 9: Comparison of Dublin-Donegal and Glasgow-Tiree PSO routes
Dublin - Donegal Glasgow - Tiree
Sector length (kms) 222 174
Service frequency Daily Daily except Sunday
Passenger traffic in 1999 10,753 5,030
Daily capacity 36 seats 19 seats
Load factor in 1999 42% 43%
Return fares €108-€123 €160 - €240
Route subsidy €750,000 €416,000
Subsidy per single trip €82 €83
% of costs subsidised 38% 31%
Source: Williams, (2001)
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Figure 1: % of total domestic scheduled seats accounted for by PSO routes (Sept 2001)
* Includes 10 new PSOs
Source: Official Airlines Guide Database
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Figure 2: Average PSO sector distance (km) by country (Sept 2001)
* Includes 10 new PSOs in addition to Umea-Ostersund
+ Umea-Ostersund
Source: Official Airlines Guide Database
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Figure 3: Average seats per aircraft deployed on PSO routes by country (Sept 2001)
* Includes 10 new PSOs in addition to Umea-Ostersund
Source: Official Airlines Guide Database
